IAC Final Report Does not Comply with Annex 13
DSIICU2011
The Polish Response to the IAC Final Report the Republic of Poland points out that the IAC Final Report violates the standards of Annex and has been prepared in violation of the guidelines contained in the ICAO Document Number 9756 entitled 'Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation,' (“ICAO Investigation Manual”). According to Annex 13, the first chapter of the final report, entitled “Factual Information,” should contain only facts; while the analysis should be included in the second chapter entitled “Analysis.” Thus, the Republic of Poland objects to the inclusion of the so-called ‘psychological analysis’ as “Factual Information.” The psychological analysis presented in this chapter is not based on facts and is not supported by evidence. To the contrary, it is based on assumptions of highly speculative nature and stands in contradiction to the Cockpit Voice Recorder (“CVR”) readings obtained by the Polish side.9
Furthermore, contrary to ICAO Investigation Manual, the analysis presented in the second chapter of the IAC Final Report is based on assumptions and hypotheses rather than facts and relevant evidence presented under “Factual Information.” Hypotheses not supported by facts should have been abandoned. Unfortunately, the hypotheses based on assumptions were not abandoned, but instead were presented without conditional clauses as explained in the Polish Response below:
The analysis should examine the evidence already presented in Chapter 1. Factual Information, and develop circumstances and situations that might occur. This should lead to the formulation of possible hypotheses that should be discussed in the context of the evidence gathered. Hypotheses unsupported by evidence should be rejected. Hypotheses may not be treated as certainties, and their proof may not rely on hypothetical evidence. The listed items are presented as statements in the form of axioms; and conditional expressions, such as likely, possible, etc., were not used even once. The analysis contains many repetitions as well as references to many facts that were not included in the Factual Information. It does not focus on the description of possible variants of the course of action and the assessment of the course of individual flight sequences. The activities of the Flights Management Group were not evaluated neither the impact of decisions taken outside the Flights Management Group on these activities. It mainly focused on proving that the activities of the controllers at the traffic control were correct.10
While the analysis of the psychological pressure presumably exerted on the Polish pilots by third persons was based on speculations not supported by any evidence contained in the Factual Information of the IAC Final Report, the analysis of psychological pressure exerted on the Russian air traffic controllers on the ground was entirely disregarded. The outside psychological pressure on the Russian Chief Air Traffic Controller (“CATC”) – who was the only person suggesting that the Tu-154M aircraft should be sent to an alternate aerodrome but was overruled by a third person present in the Flight Control Tower (“FCT”) – was not even mentioned. The IAC merely stated that the activities of the FCT controllers were correct.
The psychological pressure exerted by persons present in the FCT but not belonging to the Flights Management Group on the decision making process of the Smolensk 'Severny' controllers was not evaluated by the Russian side at all. After the official presentation of the IAC Final Report, the IAC, under pressure from the Polish side, published additional transcripts from the recording that confirmed the Polish allegations that a third person not belonging to the Flights Management Group was present in the FCT at the Smolensk 'Severny' airfield on April 10, 2010.11The presence of a third person in the FCT represents an important piece of factual information that shall be included in any accident investigation report. A full analysis of the situation at the Smolensk 'Severny' FCT should be carried out as part of the official IAC investigation in accordance with Annex 13. The analysis should evaluate the influence of that third person present in the FCT over the decision making process of the CATC.
Furthermore, the analysis presented in the IAC Final Report does not include any analysis of possible alternative courses of action and does not present any assessment as to the course of individual flight sequences. Such examination of alternative scenarios is indispensable in arriving at the final conclusion with respect to the causes of any crash.
The first chapter of the IAC Final Report emphasizes "psychological analysis" but does not address the history of the flight. According to Annex 13 and the ICAO Investigation Manual, the history of the flight should contain reconstruction of the significant portion of the flight path and location.
In violation of article 2.25(h) of Annex 13, the Accredited Representative of the Republic of Poland was not allowed to inspect the expert report on the activities of the group directing flights on 10 April 2010.
9 See further discussion under 'Contradictions in the IAC Final Report.'
10 The Polish Response in English, page 101.
11 The fourth microphone track represents recordings from the open microphone at the Near Control Place of the Flight Control Tower.
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Cover-up by "Suicide"
Remarkably convenient suicides ...
Remigiusz Mus, the flight engineer on Yak-40 whose landing immediately preceded PLF 101 and whose testimony implicated the Russian flight controllers, died of suicide.
This rounds out the death of the entirety of key witnesses whose testimonies could prove that the flight controllers bore at least partial responsibility for the mysterious crash that killed the Polish President Lech Kaczynski and 95 others near Smolensk, Russia, on April 10, 2010.
Suicide. So says the Polish Prosecutors office under the administration of Donald Tusk, Bronislaw Komorowski, and the Civic Platform party (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) - the people who came out on top following the disaster of Flight PLF 101. The position of the Prosecutors office is that the autopsy indicated death by hanging with no defensive wounds and and alcohol level of one permille (.01%).
General Konstantin Anatolyevich Morev, chief of the Federal Security Services (FSB), successor to KGB, office in Tver, who interviewed the Russian flight controllers, died at the end of August 2011. His body was found in his office. The official cause of death was a self-inflicted gunshot wound from his service revolver.
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